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MORE ON LEASES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY
— by Neil E. Harl*
The apparent position of the Internal Revenue Service in
audits and in informal communications from the National
Office in recent months has been that all leases of personal
property produce income subject to self-employment tax.1
The note on Part I of the 1992 edition of Schedule E, Form
1040, that taxpayers are to "report income and expense from
the rental of personal property on Schedule C or C-Z" has
provided confirming evidence of the IRS position.  This is
particularly important to farmers who lease farm machinery
in retirement to a tenant.
Section 1402
Section 1402 of the Internal Revenue Code2 imposes
self-employment tax on "self-employment income."  That
section states that self-employment income means —
"Net earnings from self-employment derived by an
individual from any trade or business carried on by
such individual... during any taxable year...."
(Emphasis added)3
The same code section specifies that the term "trade or
business" has, with some exceptions not relevant here, "the
same meaning as when used in section 162...."4
Meaning of trade or business
There is no doubt that a taxpayer receiving income from
allowing others to use property is subject to self-
employment tax if the operation constitutes a trade or
business.5  Similarly, an individual rendering services is
subject to self-employment tax if the activity rises to the
level of a trade or business.6
As noted above, the term "trade or business" has the
same meaning as when used in I.R.C. § 162 involving
deductibility of trade or business expenses.7  Note, however
that the statute does not define "trade or business carried on
by such individual"8 although the wording suggests that the
trade or business must be carried on by the taxpayer and
involve some taxpayer activity.
In cases decided under Section 162, the courts have
generally held that continuity and regularity of activity were
necessary before a venture could be considered a trade or
business9
________________________________________________
*
 Charles F. Curtiss Distinguished Professor in Agriculture and
Professor of Economics, Iowa State University; member of the
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An inactive venture generally has not been considered to
be a trade or business.10  Even significant levels of taxpayer
activity have not been sufficient for trade or business
status.11  The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "expenses
incident to caring for one's own investments, even though
that endeavor is full-time, are not deductible as paid or
incurred in carrying on a trade or business."12
Conclusion
If an operation does not constitute a trade or business,
and passive rental of personal property such as farm
machinery could seemingly be so characterized, self-
employment tax should not be due and routing such income
through Schedules C, F or CZ would be inappropriate.  In
addition, "rentals from real estate and from personal
property leased with the real estate" (emphasis added) are
specifically excluded from net earnings from self-
employment.13  Thus, leasing machinery with the land is a
relatively safe solution to the problem until the matter is
clarified by cases or rulings.
FOOTNOTES
1 See Harl, "Leasing Personal Property," 4 Agric. L. Dig. 1
(1993).
2 I.R.C. § 1402(a).
3 Id.
4 I.R.C. § 1402(c).
5 I.R.C. § 1402(a).  See Stevenson v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1989-357 (business of leasing and selling
portable advertising signs).
6 Batok v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1992-727 (one month's
work installing windows not continuous and regular
activity and not trade or business).
7 I.R.C. § 1402(c).
8 I.R.C. § 1402(a).
9 Stanton v. Comm’r, 399 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1968) (efforts
were "irregular and sporadic" as inventor; no trade or
business); Sloan v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1988-294,
(attorney not involved in law practice "with continuity
and regularity;" not trade or business).  See Charlton v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1988-515 (expenses incurred
seeking work as plumber); Heinemann v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1988-164 (activity as inventor while working for
U.S. Government; no trade or business).
10 Id.  See Heim v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1978-137
(corporation kept in existence to collect interest and
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principal payments on installment note; not engaged in
trade or business); Est. of Sussman v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1978-344 (retired CPA who earned no income as
accountant no longer engaged in trade or business).
11 Jones v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1988-393 (full time
auditor at college not engaged in trade or business of
gambling even though substantial activity involved).  See
Rev. Rul. 58-112, 1958-1 C.B. 323 (corporate officer
who negotiated sale of corporate stock not in trade or
business).
12 Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23 (1987)
("constant and large-scale effort" by taxpayer in
gambling activity was trade or business).
13 I.R.C. § 1402(b).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
HORSES-ALM § 1.01[2].* The plaintiff’s decedent was
killed when the decedent’s car struck the defendant’s horse
on a highway. The horse had been confined by a low fence
and the defendant testified that the gate to the pasture was
found open after the accident. The trial court granted
summary judgment to the defendant because the plaintiff
had failed to provide evidence of the defendant’s negligence
in fencing in the horse. The appellate court reversed,
holding that Miss. Code § 69-13-111 provides a
presumption that the owner of an escaped animal was
presumed to have been negligent and required the owner to
prove lack of negligence. Carpenter v. Nobile, 620 So.2d
961 (Miss. 1993).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   
    DISCHARGE-ALM § 13.03[6].* An insurance company
hired the debtor to recover and sell a stolen tractor found by
the police. The debtor made the highest bid and retained the
tractor but failed to make any payment to the company. The
debtor sold the tractor without paying the company and the
company obtained a default judgment for the price of the
tractor plus punitive damages. The company claimed that
the judgment was nondischargeable, arguing that the
Bankruptcy Court must give the default judgment issue
preclusion as to the debtor’s willful and malicious injury of
the company’s property. The court held that a default
judgment may not be accorded either claim or issue
preclusion in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding.
However, the court held that the facts of the case
demonstrated the debtor’s willful and malicious injury of
the company's property and denied the debtor’s discharge of
the judgment, including the punitive damages. In re Hale,
155 B.R. 730 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993).
EXEMPTIONS-ALM § 13.03[3].*
AUTOMOBILE. The debtor claimed the $2,000
exemption, under Va. Code § 34-26(8), for a vehicle which
was collateral for a nonpurchase money loan. The trustee
obtained an avoidance of the lien against the vehicle and
sold the vehicle at an auction. The trustee argued that in
avoiding the lien, the trustee became the lien holder and was
entitled to the proceeds of the sale of the vehicle before the
debtor could claim any exemption. The court held that under
Va. Code § 34-26, nonpurchase liens against exempt
property were void; therefore, because the lien was never
effective against the exemption, the trustee’s lien status was
junior to the exemption. The court also held that the debtor’s
exemption carried over to the proceeds of the vehicle. In re
Fenessy, 156 B.R. 22 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993).
AVOIDABLE LIENS. A creditor obtained a judgment
against the debtors in 1989 and recorded the judgment lien.
At the time the judgment lien attached, the debtor’s property
was rented to third parties. The debtors moved into the
property in 1992 and filed for bankruptcy in 1993. The
debtors claimed the California automatic homestead
exemption available in 1993 for $100,000 for residents over
the age of 55 and income of less than $20,000.  The creditor
objected to the exemption, arguing that the exemption
should be determined as of the date the judgment lien
attached in 1989 when the property was not used as a
residence. The court held that the debtors could create a
homestead exemption by moving into the property pre-
petition but that the lien was avoidable only to the extent of
the homestead exemption available to the debtors at the time
the lien attached to the property. In re Mayer, 156 B.R. 54
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1993).
HOMESTEAD. The debtor’s mortgagee obtained a
foreclosure of the mortgage against the debtors’ residence.
The debtors filed suit to invalidate the sale of the residence.
Prior to filing for bankruptcy, the debtors had entered into a
settlement with the mortgage holder to allow the debtors
time to attempt to sell the residence. Before the time
expired, the debtors filed for bankruptcy and the trustee
renegotiated the settlement agreement and eventually sold
the residence. The debtors filed an exemption for the
residence. The trustee objected to the exemption, arguing
that the foreclosure eliminated the debtors’ interest in the
residence such that on the petition date, the debtors had no
interest in the residence for which an exemption was
allowed. The court held that because the validity of the
foreclosure was never finally litigated, the debtors had a
possible interest in the residence sufficient to claim the
residence as a homestead exemption. The trustee also
argued that because the sale was made post-petition, the
debtor could not claim the exemption in the proceeds. The
court held that the debtors’ exemption continued in the
proceeds of the residence, whether sold pre- or post-petition.
In re Donaldson, 156 B.R. 51 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1993).
The debtors had been residents of Wisconsin where the
husband was a part owner of a small business for which the
debtor had guaranteed several business loans. When the
